Comité Nacional del Centenario
On December 31st 1999, at an emotional ceremony held before the main entrance of the impressive Canal Administration Building, representatives of the US Government relinquished full control of the waterway's management to Panama's President Mireya Moscoso, in accordance with the terms of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty. Thus concluded a long chapter, going back some 150 years, in the history of the disparate and occasionally tense partnership between Panama and the United States to provide a passageway between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans serving world trade and US strategic interests. Following is a synopsis of this intricate and fascinating historical chapter, which captivated the energies and emotions of several generations in Panama and many prominent politicians in the United States.
The reader is advised that this article is not an exercise in historical interpretation, but a narration of the principal milestones in the history of the Panama Canal. The account is presented from the author's perspective, which is critical of Panama's military dictatorship and the US Government's disposition to negotiate the 1977 Canal treaties with an authoritarian regime.
The 19th Century Roots of an Isthmian Ship Canal
The proposal to build a US canal in Central America had its roots in the early 19th century as part of US aspiration to world power through the expansion of trade and navigation and the protection of its newly established western and southern shores. Such purposes required that the canal be owned, operated and defended by Washington. The US Government further believed that allowing a waterway to be built by a rival power could threaten the expansion of the US economy and regional hegemony.
Beginning in the mid-19th century, Washington moved toward the goal of constructing an inter-oceanic route. In 1846, the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation (Bidlack-Mallarino) between the United States and New Granada (present-day Colombia) granted the US the right of free transit through the Isthmus of Panama, then a province of Colombia. The United States also obtained the right to preserve the neutrality and security of Panama's transit zone.
In 1850, Washington negotiated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain, whereby both states agreed not to maintain exclusive control of a canal built by either or "occupy, or fortify, or colonize or assume, or exercise any dominion" over any part of Central America. Between 1850 and 1855, a New York corporation, the Panama Railroad Company, constructed the world's first inter-oceanic railway in Panama, to expedite the transport of passengers and goods through the Isthmian transit zone. In 1901, the Clayton-Bulwer convention was superseded by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, whereby Great Britain consented to the construction of a ship canal in Central America under full control, management and regulation by the United States.
Prospects for a US-built Isthmian canal dimmed when, in 1880 a private French corporation under Ferdinand de Lesseps, builder of the Suez Canal, began construction of a proposed sea-level canal in Panama. However, by 1889 the French failure due to engineering difficulties, disease and mismanagement provided the United States with the opportunity to go through with the project. To that effect, in 1902, the vigorous leadership of President Theodore Roosevelt obtained from the US Congress approval of the Spooner Act which authorized Roosevelt to acquire the French Canal property and building rights and negotiate with Colombia for control of the area where the waterway would be built.
The Hay-Herrán Treaty, which contemplated a 99-year lease on Panama's transit zone in exchange for an annuity by the United States was, however, rejected by the Colombian Senate in August 1903. To overcome Colombian opposition, the Roosevelt Administration —in collusion with Phillipe Bunau-Varilla, a bold representative of the French Compagnie Nouvelle du Canal Interoceanique who was interested in obtaining compensation for the failed French investment in Panama— supported a Panamanian secessionist movement that would enable the United States to deal directly with Panama as an independent republic. Secessionism had been brewing in Panama for decades and reached a boiling point with the devastation brought about by the latest Colombian civil war (1899-1902) and the rejection of the Hay-Herrán Treaty.
The 1903 Isthmian Canal Convention
Panama realized its aspiration of becoming an independent state, but only with US assistance. In exchange for US support, on 18 November 1903 the Roosevelt Administration exacted from Panama the Isthmian Canal Convention. Known also as Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty, after Secretary of State John Hay and Compagnie Nouvelle representative Philippe Bunau Varilla —who acted as Panama's special envoy before the US Government— the treaty was in force for 75 contentious years, from its ratification by the US Senate on February 23rd 1904 to September 30th 1979, the eve of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty's entry into force.
The Isthmian Canal Convention gave the United States the right to build, operate and defend the Panama Canal; for which purposes Panama allowed the United States to administer the territory adjacent to the waterway, in perpetuity, as if it were sovereign in the area. Panama also gave the United States the right to reestablish public order, were it perturbed, in the cities of Panama and Colón, located at the opposite ends of the canal. A provision to allow the United States to reestablish order anywhere in the republic was also included in the country's new constitution, ratified on February 20th 1904. Article 104 of Panama's charter was reminiscent of the Platt Amendment to the 1902 Cuban Constitution, whereby the United States obtained a policing role in Cuba.
Under threat of invasion by Colombia, on December 2nd 1903 the fragile Panamanian Government accepted the onerous terms of the Isthmian Canal Convention. To reject the treaty would have meant to alienate the Roosevelt Administration, Panama's protector before Colombia. Hay and Bunau Varilla took advantage of the geopolitical factors surrounding the emergence of Panama as an independent state to extract the most convenient terms from the fledgling republic.
The 1903 Treaty furnished the legal groundwork that allowed the United States to achieve the canal's construction. The US Army sanitized the transit zone, concentrating on mosquito elimination to prevent such endemic diseases as malaria and yellow fever, which had seriously undermined the French Canal effort. Sanitation was largely achieved through the efforts of Colonel William C. Gorgas, a talented and devoted US Army physician. The waterway, a momentous engineering feat, was completed under the command of Colonel (later General) George W. Goethals of the US Army Corps of Engineers and inaugurated on August 15th 1914.
Panamanian Requests for Revisions and the Emergence of Nationalism
From its inception the 1903 treaty bred resentment in Panama. Burnau Varilla as Panama's minister plenipotentiary was widely suspected of having betrayed the country's principal asset through an unprecedented lease in perpetuity. Panamanian discontent was heightened by Washington's establishment of a quasi-colonial administration in the Canal Zone —including government-run schools, commercial establishments, a postal system, a police force, courts of law, prisons, and military bases— to the exclusion of Panamanians. US involvement in Panama's politics and public administration also produced bitterness. Panamanians had become independent to ensure self-determination but found that their future depended increasingly on US interests.
From the outset, Panama had complained about unilateral US interpretations of the treaty. On August 11th 1904, the Panamanian minister to Washington, José Domingo de Obaldía, wrote to Secretary of State Hay to emphasize that the purpose of the 1903 Convention was "to facilitate the construction of a ship canal between the Atlantic and Pacific seas", not to authorize "a cession of territory or absolute renunciation of sovereignty" by either of the contracting parties (Arosemena, 1997, Vol. II: 99). Requests for a revision of the treaty gathered support in Panama through the founding of Acción Comunal, a nationalist organization, in 1923, and the emergence of other nationalist and leftist groups at that time. Their activism resulted in the rejection by Panama's National Assembly of a draft 1926 treaty (Kellogg-Alfaro). Although seeking to amend the 1903 Isthmian Canal Convention the 1926 convention was deemed unsatisfactory by Panamanian nationalists, such as Harmodio Arias and Domingo H. Turner, two of the most outspoken opponents of the agreement in the assembly.
In 1936, President Harmodio Arias of Panama and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which abrogated the interventionist clause of the 1903 convention, one of the contested issues. The 1936 treaty also affirmed Panama's sovereignty over its air space. This treaty was a manifestation of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, which sought to conciliate Latin American animosity generally over US interventions in the region.
The Good Neighbor policy reaped benefits during World War II, when most Latin American republics aligned with the United States against the Axis powers. But in Panama, President Arnulfo Arias (Harmodio's brother, elected in 1940), a charismatic leader who elevated nationalism to new heights, resisted US demands for additional military bases on the isthmus. The US supported his ouster by Panama's police force on 7 October 1941, after President Arias sought to maintain Panama's neutrality in the war. His successor, Ricardo Adolfo de La Guardia —less committed to the nationalist cause— ensured the granting in 1942 of over 100 military installations the United States wanted throughout the isthmus.
Panamanian nationalists continued to organize during the years of World War II and once the conflict was over, opposition to US attempts to retain the military facilities grew. In December 1947, strong public pressure forced Panama's National Assembly to reject a new defense sites agreement, after which the United States withdrew from the rest of the republic and concentrated its military presence in the Canal Zone. While the Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation, signed in 1955, provided Panama with some additional economic benefits, it was far from meeting the aspirations of Panamanian nationalists, who carried out intense demonstrations in 1958 and 1959, under the direction of student leader Carlos Arellano Lennox.
Nationalist agitation in Panama, occurring in the Cold War context and in the midst of similar protest movements in subjugated countries, put Washington on guard. Fears were exacerbated by the victory of Fidel Castro and his group of revolutionaries in Cuba on January 1st 1959, the rhetoric of which resonated in every Latin American republic. To counter the effects that rising nationalism might have on US interests, Washington increased its connection with the Panamanian military. Strong links had developed between the Panamanian constabulary and the US intelligence services for many years, notoriously since the early 1940s, when the National Police participated actively in the coup against President Arias. Renamed National Guard in 1953, the constabulary began receiving military assistance from the United States after 1959.
The 1964 Riots and the Overhaul of US-Panama Relations
The fact that Panama's flag was not flown in the Canal Zone had become emblematic of the country's subordination to the United States, the unfair cession of Panamanian land to Washington in perpetuity by the 1903 Convention which no Panamanian signed, and the US "colonial" presence in the Canal Zone. All were attributed to US hegemony and the complicity between Washington and Panama's dominant sectors. The Panamanian flag thus became the symbol of the country's struggle to recover the exercise of sovereignty over the Canal Zone and obtain control of the Panama Canal. In November 1958 and 1959, demonstrations attempting to "plant" Panamanian flags in the Canal Zone had ended in clashes between US security forces and local protestors. These incidents presaged what occurred on January 9th 1964, a date still today acknowledged as the culminating point in Panama's nationalist protest movement..
In 1960, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower had ordered that the Panamanian flag should fly alongside the Stars and Stripes at certain locations. In 1962, after meeting with Panamanian President Roberto F. Chiari in Washington, President John F. Kennedy added fifteen more locations where Panama's standard should fly. On 9 January 1964, when a crowd of US residents of the Canal Zone (called "Zonians") prevented a group of Panamanian students from raising their flag at Balboa High School, the Panamanian banner was torn. As news of the altercation spread throughout Panama City and Colón, thousands of Panamanian protestors took to the streets adjacent to the Canal Zone, where they were fired upon by U.S. soldiers stationed there as part of the US Southern Command. Violence escalated with Panamanian radios transmitting details to the entire country to an incensed population. For several days the areas bordering the Canal Zone were the scene of bloodshed, fires, and looting. The tragic balance of the riots was twenty-three Panamanians and four US soldiers dead, plus scores of injured and widespread property destruction.
Broadcasted around the world, the dramatic events of January 1964 sparked widespread sympathy for Panama as the underdog and condemnation for the United States. It was President Lyndon B. Johnson's first international crisis since assuming office after the Kennedy assassination. Fearing a communist takeover in Panama, he determined to engage in a significant overhaul of U.S. relations with Panama. Through the good offices of the Organization of American States (OAS), diplomatic relations were restored on April 3rd 1964 and treaty negotiations commenced.
By 1967, bilateral talks had advanced to the point of producing three texts concerning the Panama Canal, US military bases on the isthmus and the possible construction of a sea-level canal. The treaties contemplated an orderly handover of the Canal to Panama culminating in 1999 and the legalization of a US military presence on the isthmus. The "three-in-one" treaties had been initialed by representatives of both countries and were ready for submittal to their respective legislative branches, but the proximity of elections in Panama and vocal Panamanian opposition to the texts suspended the process.
The primary objection of Panamanian nationalists focused on the legalization of US military facilities, which had not been formally contemplated in any of the preceding canal treaties. Panama had consented to the US military presence only for purposes of canal defense, not as a vital part of US security arrangements, as Washington was now proposing. Notwithstanding these disagreements, the Johnson Administration was hoping for a treaty approval in Panama after the May 1968 elections, as part of the agenda of a new Panamanian president. When the popular, charismatic but unpredictable Arnulfo Arias was elected as Panama's president for the third time, representatives of the US government began to lobby with him for swift approval of the "three-in-one" treaties.
Concurrently, the United States was pursuing another strategy through its support for the National Guard. Visualizing the Guard as a deterrent to nationalist and communist agitation on the isthmus (a role played by US-backed constabularies elsewhere in the region), US assistance levels mounted after 1964 to include training, equipment, and payment of part of the Guard's payroll. From the School of the Americas, situated at a spectacular location at the Atlantic entrance to the canal, the United States gave counterinsurgency and civic action instruction to Panama's military, stimulating their encroachment in the political arena. Almost immediately after his inauguration, President Arias took steps to reduce the power of the National Guard. When the Guard retaliated by staging a military coup on October 11th 1968, the United States could rest assured that responsive collaborators controlled Panama.
Treaty Completion under the Military Regime, 1968-1978
Panama's National Guard took power not to promote any specific ideology or political program, but to prevent the removal of its corporate privileges and benefits which US assistance had helped build. After December 1969, when with CIA support Omar Torrijos consolidated his role as leader of the Panamanian military government, the regime began to implement a legitimizing strategy based on Panama's historic struggle for nationalist affirmation to offset the military dictatorship's fierce repression of its opponents and de facto rule. The strategy consisted of promoting Torrijos as a populist and nationalistic leader both at home and abroad, especially in Latin America and among the "non-aligned" states.
Facilitated by the elimination of freedom of expression and the curtailment of other constitutional rights as well as the suppression of democratic institutions, the regime's propaganda efforts reaped significant benefits. Directly following President Arias' overthrow, the new regime suspended the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and placed the press under censorship. The military expropriated opposition media, including Editora Panamá América, which published three major dailies and was owned by the family of Presidents Harmodio and Arnulfo Arias. At the hands of regime security personnel, known opponents suffered imprisonment, torture, exile, assassination or simply "disappeared." Casting the country's military leader into a nationalistic role was easier with the opposition out of the way.
Torrijos' government declared the 1967 draft treaties "worthless" and in 1971 requested the reinstatement of the negotiating process. When the Nixon Administration procrastinated, Torrijos played the nationalist card and emphasized his broadening international connections, all of which resounded in Washington circles fearful of a replay of the Cuban revolution. An astute strategist who knew well how to deal with the United States, in his relations with Washington the Panamanian dictator applied sufficient pressure to alarm but not antagonize policymakers. At the same time, he was ready to cooperate with Washington and international capital to promote US strategic and economic interests in Panama and in the region. A long association with the US army as a paid informant of US military intelligence (1955-1970) and a recipient of US military training helped him develop these skills, as did guidance provided by a team of shrewd Panamanian negotiators as well as regional and "non-aligned" leaders.
In 1973, Torrijos achieved a resounding victory when the United Nations approved his proposal to hold a meeting of the Security Council in Panama for the purpose of considering Panama's demands for treaty revision. A resolution in support of these demands, discussed on March 20th 1973, was only defeated by the US veto, which caused Washington further embarrassment. Negotiations reinitiated in November 1973 and on February 7th 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Tack signed a joint declaration listing eight guiding points for continuing talks. However, President Richard Nixon's resignation a few months later, on August 9th 1974, brought the talks to a virtual standstill.
Negotiations gained momentum once Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency on January 20th 1977. Intent on repairing what he saw as unfair treatment of Panama by the United States, President Carter waged a determined and prolonged battle to convince the people of the United States that the Canal should be transferred to Panama. His position was even more difficult because, contrary to his ideals of promoting and preserving human rights, he had to negotiate and sign vital treaties with a military dictator.
A government that championed human rights as no other US administration had previously advocated found itself negotiating and afterward entering into an agreement of far-reaching effects with a military regime that denied those same rights to its population and whose claim to represent the nation lacked democratic credentials. On September 7th 1977, at a ceremony held at the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington, D.C., US President Jimmy Carter and Panamanian military strongman Omar Torrijos signed the Panama Canal Treaty, which provided for the transfer of the waterway from US to Panamanian jurisdiction over a twenty-year period, and the Neutrality Treaty, which established the waterway's neutrality under joint US and Panamanian protection. The treaties stipulated an end to US administration of the Panama Canal and the 553 square-mile Panama Canal Zone as well as to Washington's military operations in Panama after nearly one century of statutory US presence on the isthmus.
After the September 1977 signing ceremony, Torrijos agreed to submit the treaties to a referendum, without, however, allowing a free and informed discussion of the texts. In an attempt to secure an impressive share of the vote, the military government also manipulated the voting process. As an indication of the regime's repressive quality, the eve of President Carter's visit to Panama, on June 15th 1978, two treaty opponents were shot to death and several hundred others severely beaten by paramilitary squads.
Subsequent to Panama's approval in the referendum of October 23rd 1977, in early 1978 President Carter sent the treaties to the Senate for its advice and consent. Thus began one of the most controversial debates in the upper chamber of the US Congress, eliciting strong reactions from conservative sectors which, in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam, saw treaty approval as the equivalent to giving away US property to the enemies of the United States. These were met by inspired argumentation focusing on notions of fairness deeply imbedded in the tradition of the US founding.
President Carter succeeded in putting together a broad coalition of civic, religious, and business leaders and eventually obtained the support of sixty-seven senators, the minimum required to pass the treaties Faced with fierce opposition in the U.S. Congress, both Carter and Torrijos were obliged to compromise. Despite the administration's strenuous efforts, approval came only after the Senate added a number of reservations and conditions to the treaties, the principal of which was the DeConcini Reservation, after its proponent, Senator Dennis DeConcini (R-Arizona), which allowed US intervention at any point in Panama to counter what in the U.S. Government's judgment might constitute a threat to the canal's security or operation. The addition of conditions and reservations to the original texts approved by Panama posed an international relations problem, for these additions were not submitted to approval in the republic. Still, the military government decided to abide by them.
The Panama Canal Treaty entered into force on October 1st 1979. Pursuant to its stipulations, the Canal Zone ceased to exist and land and property under US jurisdiction was gradually transferred to Panama. In the hands of the military government, much property was assigned to non-productive uses. Panama also acquired a formal role in the administration of the canal and, as a result of treaty provisions, the Panamanian armed forces received additional assistance from the United States. This further strengthened the grip of the military on Panamanian politics.
Some Consequences of the 1977 Treaties
The Panama Canal Treaty expired on December 31st 1999. A long, twenty-year transition period thus ended, the first decade of which unfolded under Panama's military government, a time of extensive political corruption culminating in the US invasion of December 20th 1989. Although, as recognized by President Carter, Panamanian demands for national self-determination were justified, the fact that they were recognized through negotiation with a military regime had deleterious consequences for Panama. The process served to curtail democratic development, preventing Panamanians from broadly discussing the most consequential political issue of the century. The covert military ties may well have prevented Panama from obtaining a truly fair settlement with the United States and establishing a mature, independent and democratic state, a central goal of its nationalist political movement for decades.
Through open, democratic debate, Panamanians would have been better prepared to discern solutions to future developments, such as the contamination of US-operated defense sites throughout the country, the expansion of the waterway, and the shape of relations to the US in the 21st century, pending issues on the country's foreign agenda. A democratic decision-making process might well have rejected the strengthening of the National Guard, which had such harmful effects on Panama's national development and ultimately led to a destructive confrontation with the United States.
As a result of treaty provisions, the National Guard received additional assistance from the United States. Between 1969 and 1978, Washington provided $10.6 million to Panama in total military assistance (loans and grants, current US dollars). Between 1979 and 1987, military assistance increased by fourfold to $48.8 million. Additionally, in 1985-1986 the Reagan Administration provided Security Supporting Assistance for a total of $63.2 million. The rationale behind the US-abetted military buildup, which further strengthened the grip of the military on Isthmian politics, was the Panamanian armed force's expanding role, alongside the US military, in defending the Panama Canal, pursuant to the 1977 agreements.
In the hands of the military government, much property transferred by the United States was assigned to non-productive uses, such as facilities for an expanding bureaucracy and National Guard or housing and recreational services for regime favorites. Under military control, the sustainable development of these areas and their integration to the Panamanian economy, after being prevented by the United States for over several decades, were further postponed. Although these and others were lamentable developments, they do not obscure the fact that through the efforts of several Panamanian generations, Panama finally asserted its sovereignty over the transit zone and attained the conditions allowing for a more egalitarian and beneficial relationship with the United States in December 1999, as a result of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty.
vuelve * For comments and suggestions improving the quality of this text, the author is grateful to Gloria Guardia, Brittmarie Janson Pérez, Lindsay A. Mann, and Gloria Rudolf.
*Dirección: Associate Professor Mary Addis*
*Realización: Cheryl Johnson*
*Modificado 24/07/03*
*© Istmo, 2001*